By M. Seyfettin Erol for Anadolu Agency Analysis Department
Translated by Anadolu Agency English News Service
ISTANBUL
The Idlib issue is, once again, on the agenda. The Assad regime attacked reinforcement Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) elements sent to the region to prevent armed conflict, martyring seven soldiers and one civilian and injuring 13 others, raising tensions in the region. Turkey’s response certainly has and will not be limited to Syria, as the message sent to Turkey through Idlib is not limited to Syria alone. Thus, the regime attack seems to have triggered the beginning of a process that will result in major shifts in Turkish foreign policy and global/regional-scale geopolitics.
In this regard, it is important to point out that the Assad regime’s attack not only targeted the TAF, but also the Astana and Sochi processes -- which were based on the cooperation of Turkey, Russia and Iran. This regime attack also confirmed that some concerns and warnings previously voiced by Turkey were not groundless. Therefore, it is clear that this attack will affect Turkish-Russian relations, as well as the Turkey-Russia-Iran cooperation process. Russia and Iran are the two key powers behind the Assad regime. Of these two, it does not seem plausible that the Assad regime would be able to act without the knowledge and approval of Russia, in particular. Assessments to the contrary cannot be taken seriously.
Its timing also gives clues about the purpose of the attack itself. Taking a closer look at the developments prior to the attack, we find the following important points;
Therefore, this attack is not a surprise. The surprise will be hidden in the potential resulting developments, especially in what Turkey’s response will be. What does this regime attack in Idlib mean? Why was the attack carried out now? What sorts of messages did it carry? What kind of process could it have triggered? How might Turkey respond to the attack? What types of options does Ankara have?
Turkey-Russia-Iran at a crossroads?
On Sept. 8, 2018, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s official Twitter account read: "If the world turns a blind eye to the killing of tens of thousands of innocent people to further the regime’s interests, we will neither watch from the sidelines nor participate in such a game." President Erdogan made this statement in five languages: Turkish, Arabic, English, Russian and Persian, right after his return from the tense Tehran Summit. There was clearly deep meaning behind the announcement being published in Russian and Persian.
The developments in the Tehran leg of the Astana process rendered Astana “a lame duck” for Turkey. The name of the crisis was “Idlib.” Iran’s insistence on the Idlib issue through Russia pointed to nothing less than a “fracture.” Such a fracture was prevented via the Erdogan-Putin meeting in Sochi on Sept. 17, 2018, with the crisis freezing when the Sochi agreement was signed following deliberations between the two leaders. At the least, the collaboration between Turkey and Russia was preserved, with the sides deciding to continue with the extended Eurasia-centered cooperation aiming to create a multipolar globe, which was signed on Nov. 16, 2001, and revitalized on June 27, 2019.
However, the developments regarding Idlib during the Syrian civil war started revealing that the deep crisis between Turkey and Russia had only been suspended and that it was only the tip of the iceberg. Russia’s indecisiveness regarding the latest developments in Ukraine and also the Eastern Mediterranean--Black Sea line points to a rough future for Turkish-Russian bilateral relations.
In addition, the Iran factor also affects the Turkish-Russian relations in Syria to the same extent as the regime. The opinion in Ankara following the Tehran Summit is that Russia and Iran are together looking to make a new play in the region through Assad. The role ascribed to Idlib in this play is important in pointing to the persistence over the region. In fact, regime and Russia-Iran backed forces are waging war on Turkey and the military forces that Turkey is supporting, rather than fighting against the PYD-YPG/PKK terror organizations threatening to the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of Syria.
An important but often overlooked matter is the fact that the U.S. is not the only party uncomfortable with Turkish-Russian cooperation. The developments which took place during this process made Moscow -- who, with the Assad regime forces, also targeted the TAF -- even more prominent. The policies of Iran, which made its attitude towards Turkey clear at the Tehran Summit, along with Russia’s response to these policies, are critical for the future of Turkish-Russian relations. It is clear that Russia has reached the end of its management of the related parties in the region, starting with Aleppo, as this “management” policy is beginning to work against Turkey.
Russia’s approach toward the TAF during these developments is also remarkable. Claiming that Moscow had not been informed of Turkey’s deployment of reinforcements, the Russian Defense Ministry said in a quite thought-provoking statement: "Turkish military units made movements inside the Idlib de-escalation zone on the night from Feb. 2 to Feb. 3 without warning the Russian side and came under fire from Syrian government forces aimed against terrorists in the area west of the village of Seracab [Saraqib]."
Idlib is Turkey’s red line!
The actions of Russia and Iran resulting in new migration waves -- a red line of Turkey -- frankly are received by Ankara as threats to its interests and national security, leading to questions on the sincerity of the two constituents of the Astana process. Both these countries are well aware that a large-scale conflict in Idlib would result in massacres of civilians and a new wave of millions of migrants and would facilitate the infiltration of terrorist groups.
Another circumstance that they know of is that Idlib functions as a crucial buffer zone for Turkey. Its regional policy on Syria will take a substantial hit if it lost this buffer zone. At the least, Ankara is very clearly aware of the fact that Assad and the regime forces have turned into components of the proxy war carried out against Turkey in the region. Thus, Ankara cannot be expected to go along with a fait accompli disregarding its sensitivities, concerns and interests during this crucial phase of the Syrian civil war.
In this regard, President Erdogan’s speech in Ankara a few days ago on Jan. 31 is crucial:
"Our country can not handle a new wave of migration. In addition, we can not stand by and let new threats push up on our borders. No nation’s political or economic interests are more important than the national security and sovereignty of Turkey. In this regard, we will not be bystanders to the situation in Idlib, or in other regions of Syria. The operations Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch and Peace Spring, which we’ve been conducting since 2016, are the most tangible examples to the initiatives taken in order to take control of the situation in the field in case [our] sensibilities are disregarded."
Erdogan also added that Turkey would do "whatever is necessary" regarding those who are "threats to our country." This statement is complementary to previous remarks by Ankara that it was "determined to destroy the terror corridor east of the Euphrates," no matter what. Another statement by President Erdogan that Turkey would "do whatever is necessary [against] those who are threats to our country," on the other hand, does not limit the terror corridor to terrorist organizations.
Therefore, though it was said on Oct. 22, 2019 that efforts to create a terror corridor in the south of Turkey had fizzled out, the building process of the terror corridor seems to be continuing to this day. It can be deduced that the Syrian regime and the powers behind it are aiming mainly to prevent Turkey from opening to the Middle East, as well as to secure their own assets and projects (such as the Mediterranean Corridor Project) by building the “New Syria.” Frankly, an attempt to remove Turkey from the region is underway under the pretense of "cooperation," confirming again the shifting ground and fickle nature of post-Cold War international relations.
This explains to a large extent why Turkey is insisting on the balancing aspect of its foreign policy and why it must act cautiously, in this regard. As explained above, the ground is very unstable and Turkey must follow a rational foreign policy that buys itself time and improves its maneuverability within the contextual reality of its politics, strategy and tools. This consequently depends on increasing its options.
A crossroads in Turkish-Russian relations?
The regime attack in Idlib presented itself as a last-minute development that reinforced a possible parting of ways in case of a "conflict of interests" between the two nations, which had been seen until recently an unlikely possibility and nothing more than a claim until. In this regard, if the balance or harmony between the battlefield and diplomacy is not established, new roadmaps that involve Syria may gain currency.
Hence, President Erdogan’s message following his visit to Senegal points exactly at this. Stating that Russia had not been loyal to the agreements reached in Astana and Sochi, Erdogan asserted that Turkey was "running out of patience," that it would do whatever was necessary and that Turkey would take matters into its own hands unless the bombs stopped falling on Idlib.
Erdogan warned that Turkey would "neither watch from the sidelines, nor participate in such a game." Combined with his statement that Turkey would be taking matters into its own hands, these remarks certainly paint a clearer picture. In this regard, Idlib presents itself as a crisis that illustrates the misalignment between Russia's words and actions. Therefore, the trust issues between the two countries may turn into a security problem for Turkey. These trust issues can be found at the essence of why President Erdogan was pushed to make such an announcement. That is also why his assertion that Turkey's "interlocutor" is not Russia, but the Syrian regime is important.
On the other hand, it would be a big mistake to think that the security problems that Turkey will face will be limited to regions near the Turkish borders. Instability in Turkey would essentially create a chaotic atmosphere in the neighboring regions as well. This would deepen existing crises and reactivate crisis fault lines not only in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, but also in the Balkans and the Black Sea-Caucasus line.
Turkey’s options
With the Idlib regime attack, Astana and Sochi essentially became meaningless. Likewise, it does not seem that the "interlocutor" issue on the Adana Agreement, the validity of which is questionable in the given circumstances, will be very promising for a tangible result. Thus, it seems inescapable that Turkey and Russia will have to start a new process in a new format for collaboration appropriate to the reality of the "New Syria." It is important that Turkey and Russia be the only main actors throughout this process, as the disruptiveness of a third party has been confirmed with the latest events. Russia will either abide by this, or continue on its way with a third actor. Turkey's patience has been exhausted.
Russia's overly pragmatic policies and increase in its regional and global power disproportionate to its potential are playing into the hands of other actors, the U.S. in particular. Turkey might have to reconsider its policies if Russia continues to maintain its position in the region. It would be naive to think that this would be limited to Syria.
In this regard, the strengthening of Turkey's NATO membership with "NATOME" (NATO - Middle East) may no longer be a possibility and Russia's southern politics might be forced in a different direction. Russia may focus more on the Black Sea rather than the Eastern Mediterranean, where it is currently trying to increase its influence. It will be crucial for Russia to reevaluate its current position and attitude towards Turkey due to its geopolitical-strategic importance, in order to secure the continuation of the spirit of Nov. 16, 2001. In this context, Idlib is today a much more important testing field for the future of Turkish-Russian relations than it was previously. The smell of provocation is exceedingly in the air, with new developments at the doorstep.
[M. Seyfettin Erol is a professor at Ankara Haci Bayram Veli University and the chairman of Ankara Centre for Crisis and Policy Research -- ANKASAM]
* Opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Anadolu Agency.
